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 In this insurance dispute between appellant Allstate 
Property & Casualty Insurance Co. (“Allstate”) and appellee 
Jared Wolfe, we are presented with the question of whether 
punitive damages awarded against an insured in a personal 
injury suit are recoverable in a later breach of contract or bad 
faith suit against the insurer.  It is Pennsylvania’s public 
policy that insurers cannot insure against punitive damages, 
and we therefore predict that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
will answer that question in the negative.   
 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Underlying Personal Injury Lawsuit 
 
 On March 2, 2007, around 4:00 am, Karl Zierle 
finished his fifteenth or sixteenth beer for the night.  At 11:00 
am, Zierle was driving and rear-ended Wolfe.  Zierle’s blood 
alcohol level tested at 0.25%.  Zierle also had three prior 
DUIs.  Wolfe was injured in this accident, and he required 
treatment at the emergency room.   
 
 Zierle was insured by Allstate.  Zierle’s policy 
provided liability coverage up to $50,000, and the policy 
required Allstate to defend Zierle in suits by third parties 
arising out of automobile accidents.  The policy stated that 
Allstate would “not defend an insured person sued for 
damages which are not covered by this policy.”  (App. 362.)  
Zierle’s policy expressly excluded coverage for punitive 
damages.   
 
 Wolfe made an initial settlement demand to Allstate of 
$25,000, based on medical records provided to Allstate’s 
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adjuster.  Allstate valued Wolfe’s claim at $1200 to $1400, 
and Allstate responded with a counteroffer of $1200.  Wolfe 
rejected this offer, and neither party moved from those 
numbers.   
 
 Wolfe then filed suit against Zierle.  Allstate informed 
Zierle that, because Wolfe’s complaint did not indicate the 
extent of the damages he was claiming, the possibility 
remained that Zierle could face damages in excess of the 
$50,000 protection afforded by his policy.  If the verdict did 
exceed the policy limit, Zierle was warned that he would be 
personally liable for the excess.  Zierle was advised that he 
could hire an attorney at his own expense to cooperate with 
Allstate’s counsel.  Zierle did hire his own counsel, but that 
attorney was not actively involved in the case.  
 
 During discovery, Wolfe learned of the extent of 
Zierle’s intoxication and amended the complaint to add a 
claim for punitive damages.  Allstate wrote to Zierle about the 
potential for punitive damages and reminded him that those 
damages were not covered under his policy.  Allstate advised 
Zierle that if a verdict was rendered against him on the 
punitive damages claim, Allstate would not pay that portion 
of the verdict, and he would be held responsible for it.   
 
 During pretrial settlement conferences, two separate 
Court of Common Pleas judges placed a settlement value of 
$7500 on the compensatory damage portion of the case.  
Wolfe now indicates that he would have settled the case for 
$7500, although he had never communicated this willingness 
to Allstate.  Prior to trial, Wolfe reiterated the $25,000 
demand and emphasized that Allstate’s $1200 offer was too 
low.  Allstate stated that it would not increase its $1200 offer 
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(despite having authority to offer $1400) unless Wolfe 
reduced his $25,000 demand.  No further efforts at settlement 
were made by either party. 
 
 The case went to trial, and the jury awarded Wolfe 
$15,000 in compensatory damages and $50,000 in punitive 
damages.  Allstate paid the $15,000 compensatory damages 
award, but not the $50,000 punitive damages award.  
Following the trial, in return for Wolfe’s agreement not to 
enforce the punitive damages judgment against him 
personally, Zierle assigned his rights against Allstate to 
Wolfe.   
 
B. Procedural History 
 
 Wolfe, in Zierle’s shoes, sued Allstate in the 
Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas for Lycoming County, 
alleging breach of contract; bad faith conduct under 
Pennsylvania’s bad faith statute, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8371; 
and violation of Pennsylvania’s Unfair Trade Practices and 
Consumer Protection Law (“UTPCPL”), 73 Pa. Stat. Ann. §§ 
201-1 et seq.1  Under the breach of contract claim, Wolfe 
sought to recover the $50,000 in punitive damages awarded 
against Zierle, interest on that award, and attorney’s fees and 
costs for his later suit.  Under section 8371, Wolfe sought an 
award of statutory interest, punitive damages, and an 
assessment of court costs.  Allstate removed the case to the 
United States District Court for the Middle District of 
Pennsylvania under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b).   
 
                                              
1 The UTPCPL claim is not at issue before us on appeal.  
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 Allstate filed two pretrial motions that are the subject 
of this appeal.  The District Court denied both motions.  
Those orders are now before us for review.  First, Allstate 
moved for summary judgment, characterizing Wolfe’s claim 
as attacking Allstate’s failure to settle because settlement 
would have avoided the potential for the punitive damages 
award.  Allstate urged that, since it had no duty to indemnify 
for punitive damages, it could not be required to consider the 
potential for punitive damages when deciding whether to 
settle the compensatory claim.  Allstate also argued that it 
should be granted summary judgment based on the fact that 
the jury’s compensatory damages award was within the 
policy limits and Allstate paid that portion of the verdict.  The 
District Court concluded that—separate and apart from the 
punitive damages aspect—Allstate had a fiduciary duty to 
negotiate a settlement in good faith on behalf of Zierle, and 
Allstate refused to increase its settlement offer over a period 
of years.  Accordingly, a reasonable jury could find that 
Allstate was reckless and acted unreasonably during the 
settlement negotiations, amounting to bad faith.  For the same 
reasons, the District Court denied summary judgment on the 
breach of contract claim.   
 
 Second, Allstate filed a motion in limine to exclude 
evidence related to the punitive damages awarded in the 
underlying trial.  Allstate argued that Wolfe was barred as a 
matter of public policy from claiming the $50,000 punitive 
damages award as an item of damages, because 
indemnification for punitive damages was impermissible 
under Pennsylvania law.  Allstate also argued that the 
evidence relating to the punitive damages award was 
irrelevant.  The District Court denied the motion, because if a 
jury concluded that Allstate had failed to negotiate a 
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settlement of the compensatory damages portion of Wolfe’s 
claim in good faith, then the $50,000 would be relevant as 
flowing from that failure.  If Allstate had settled the claim, 
then punitive damages would not have been awarded.  
Therefore, the District Court reasoned, the $50,000 was 
relevant because it constituted damages resulting from 
Allstate’s bad faith and breach of contract.  
  
 After trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of 
Wolfe.  The jury found that Allstate had violated 
Pennsylvania’s bad faith statute and breached its contract 
with Zierle.  The jury awarded no compensatory damages and 
$50,000 in punitive damages.   
 
 Allstate appealed from these orders and also claimed 
on appeal that Wolfe lacked standing because Wolfe’s claim 
was based on an impermissible assignment of Zierle’s rights.  
Because there were conflicting decisions in Pennsylvania and 
federal courts concerning the assignability of a bad faith 
claim brought under section 8371, we certified that question 
to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which granted our 
petition for certification.  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
concluded that “the entitlement to assert damages under 
Section 8371 may be assigned by an insured to an injured 
plaintiff and judgment creditor such as Wolfe.”  Allstate 
Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Wolfe, 105 A.3d 1181, 1188 (Pa. 
2014).  Given the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision 
that Zierle’s assignment was permissible, we now turn to our 
analysis of Allstate’s remaining claims. 
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II. DISCUSSION2 
 
 Two issues are before us on appeal:  First, did the 
District Court err by permitting Wolfe to introduce the 
punitive damages award from the underlying suit as evidence 
of damages?  Second, did the District Court err by denying 
Allstate’s motion for summary judgment and holding that 
Allstate had no duty to consider the potential for punitive 
damages when valuing the compensatory claim, since the 
compensatory damages award was within the policy limits, 
which Allstate paid to Wolfe in full? 
 
 It is undisputed that the substantive law of 
Pennsylvania applies here.  In the absence of a controlling 
decision by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, we must predict 
how it would decide the questions of law presented in this 
case.  Berrier v. Simplicity Mfg., Inc., 563 F.3d 38, 45-46 (3d 
Cir. 2009).  “In predicting how the highest court of the state 
would resolve the issue, we must consider ‘relevant state 
precedents, analogous decisions, considered dicta, scholarly 
works, and any other reliable data tending convincingly to 
show how the highest court in the state would decide the issue 
at hand.’”  Id. at 46 (quoting Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
Buffetta, 230 F.3d 634, 637 (3d Cir. 2000)).3  
                                              
2 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
1332(a)(1); we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1291. 
3 The District Court did not conduct a prediction analysis.  
However, we can do a prediction analysis because, had it 
conducted such an analysis, our review of that analysis would 
be plenary.  Berrier, 563 F.3d at 46 n.12. 
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A. Motion in Limine 
 
 First, we address Allstate’s arguments regarding 
whether the District Court committed error in denying the 
motion in limine.  Wolfe persuaded the District Court to 
admit evidence of the punitive damages award because, if 
Allstate had acted in accordance with its contractual duty and 
negotiated in good faith to settle Wolfe’s claim against Zierle, 
the case never would have gone to trial, and the jury never 
would have awarded punitive damages against Zierle.  
Allstate argues that, by allowing Wolfe to present to the jury 
evidence of the punitive damages award in the underlying 
trial as damages in his current suit against Allstate, the 
District Court circumvented Pennsylvania’s public policy 
against insuring punitive damages.   
 
 “We review a district court’s evidentiary decisions for 
abuse of discretion.  To the extent the challenge involves a 
legal inquiry, . . . our review is plenary.”  Mulholland v. Gov’t 
Cnty. of Berks, Pa., 706 F.3d 227, 244 n.25 (3d Cir. 2013) 
(citation omitted).  We must determine whether the earlier 
punitive damages award was properly considered an item of 
compensable damages in the later breach of contract action 
and, in so doing, determine the relevance of the earlier 
punitive damages award.  We predict that the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court would conclude that, in an action by an 
insured against his insurer for bad faith, the insured may not 
collect as compensatory damages the punitive damages 
awarded against it in the underlying lawsuit.  Therefore, the 
punitive damages award was not relevant in the later suit and 
should not have been admitted. 
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 Our prediction is a logical extension of Pennsylvania’s 
policy regarding the uninsurability of punitive damages.  It is 
Pennsylvania’s longstanding rule that a claim for punitive 
damages against a tortfeasor who is personally guilty of 
outrageous and wanton misconduct is excluded from 
insurance coverage as a matter of law.  See Butterfield v. 
Giuntoli, 670 A.2d 646, 654 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995).  The 
Pennsylvania Superior Court, in Esmond v. Liscio, 224 A.2d 
793, 799 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1966), held that “public policy does 
not permit a tortfeasor . . . to shift the burden of punitive 
damages to his insurer.”  This rule is based on the view that 
punitive damages are not intended as compensation.  “They 
are, rather, a penalty, imposed to punish the defendant and to 
deter him and others from similar ‘outrageous’ conduct.”  Id.4  
“[S]ocially irresponsible drivers” who are “guilty of reckless 
and grossly offensive conduct on the highways” should not be 
allowed to escape the “personal punishment” of punitive 
damages.  Id.  “To permit insurance against the sanction of 
punitive damages would be to permit such offenders to 
purchase a freedom of misconduct altogether inconsistent 
with the theory of civil punishment which such damages 
represent.”  Id.   
 
 Furthermore, shifting punitive damages to insurers 
would result in insurers pricing up policies to factor in drivers 
who behave egregiously.  “[T]he delinquent driver must not 
be allowed to receive a windfall at the expense of purchasers 
                                              
4 Esmond has been cited with approval by the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court for the proposition that “it is clear that 
punitive damages are not intended to compensate the plaintiff 
for his injuries.”  Colodonato v. Consol. Rail Corp., 470 A.2d 
475, 479 (Pa. 1983).   
11 
 
of insurance, transferring his responsibility for punitive 
damages to the very people—the driving public—to whom he 
is a menace.”  Id. (quoting Nw. Nat’l Cas. Co. v. McNulty, 
307 F.2d 432, 442 (5th Cir. 1962)).  Because Pennsylvania 
law prohibits insurers from providing coverage for punitive 
damages in order to ensure that tortfeasors are directly 
punished, we hold that Allstate cannot be responsible for 
punitive damages incurred in the underlying lawsuit.  To hold 
otherwise would shift the burden of the punitive damages to 
the insurer, in clear contradiction of Pennsylvania public 
policy. 
 
 California, Colorado, and New York have similar 
prohibitions on the indemnification of punitive damages, and 
those states’ highest courts have similarly held that an insured 
cannot shift to the insurance company its responsibility for 
the punitive damages in a later case alleging a bad faith 
failure to settle by the insurer.  See PPG Indus., Inc. v. 
Transamerica Ins. Co., 975 P.2d 652 (Cal. 1999); Lira v. 
Shelter Ins. Co., 913 P.2d 514 (Colo. 1996); Soto v. State 
Farm Ins. Co., 635 N.E.2d 1222 (N.Y. 1994). 
 
 In Lira, the Supreme Court of Colorado held that “in 
an action by an insured against his insurer for bad faith failure 
to settle, the insured may not collect as compensatory 
damages the punitive damages awarded against him in the 
underlying lawsuit.”  913 P.2d at 516.  Colorado’s public 
policy prohibited an insurance carrier from providing 
coverage for punitive damages, and “[t]o allow the petitioner 
in this case to recover compensatory damages which derive 
from his own wrongful conduct undercuts the public policy of 
this state against the insurability of punitive damages.”  Id. at 
517.  The court noted: 
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The damages which are claimed to be 
“compensatory” in the instant case are none 
other than the punitive damages from the 
underlying case.  The contract between the 
parties expressly precluded recovery for 
punitive damages incurred by the insured.  The 
insured may not later utilize the tort of bad faith 
to effectively shift the cost of punitive damages 
to his insurer when such damages are expressly 
precluded by the underlying insurance contract. 
 
Id. at 517. 
 
 The Lira court also concluded that “[a]n insurer who 
has not contracted to insure against its insured’s liability for 
punitive damages had no duty to settle the compensatory part 
of an action in order to minimize the insured’s exposure to 
punitive damages.”  Id. at 516.5  “Thus, if the insurer has no 
                                              
5 The Lira court cites Magnum Foods, Inc. v. Continental 
Casualty Co., 36 F.3d 1491, 1506 (10th Cir. 1994), as support 
for this proposition.  The cited portion of Magnum Foods 
focuses on the insurer’s duty of good faith where uninsured 
punitive damages are present, rather than on whether those 
punitive damages are compensable in a later bad faith lawsuit 
against the insurer.  Magnum Foods as a whole, however, 
supports our view on the question of whether punitive 
damages are appropriately considered in calculating the 
compensatory damages.  The United States Court of Appeals 
for the Tenth Circuit concluded that “there was error in the 
compensatory damages award ($750,000) on the bad faith 
claim because it was based . . . on consideration of the 
$600,000 amount that Magnum paid to settle the punitive 
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contractual duty to indemnify the insured for punitive 
damages, the insurer has no tort duty to settle in good faith 
with regard to punitive damages.”  Id. at 517.  
 
 In PPG Industries, the California Supreme Court held 
that an insurer’s breach of the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing in failing to accept a settlement offer within policy 
limits was not the proximate cause of a punitive damages 
award.  Instead, the punitive damages award proximately 
resulted from the insured’s own intentional misconduct—
failing to follow industry safety standards in installing 
windshields—and so punitive damages were not recoverable 
from the insurer.  The court was convinced that there were 
two causes of the punitive damages award:  the insurance 
company’s alleged negligence in failing to settle the third 
party lawsuit, and “the insured’s own intentional and 
egregious misconduct in installing the windshield.”  975 P.2d 
at 655.  Only the former involved the insurer. 
 
 The court was persuaded that California public policy 
precluded an insured from shifting the obligation to pay 
punitive damages to its insurer.  “To require [the insurer] to 
make good the loss [the insured] incurred as punitive 
damages in the third party lawsuit would impose on [the 
insurer] an obligation to indemnify, a violation of the public 
                                                                                                     
damage award entered against it in the state court suit.  This 
in effect shifted Magnum’s punitive liability to the insurer 
which, in the circumstances of this case, violated Oklahoma 
public policy.”  Id. at 1507.  The Tenth Circuit required a new 
trial on the bad faith claim, where Magnum could seek 
compensatory damages based on injury other than the 
$600,000 payment.  This is the same result we reach here. 
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policy against indemnification for punitive damages.”  Id. at 
658.  The California Supreme Court also explained that “the 
purposes of punitive damages . . . are to punish the defendant 
and to deter future misconduct by making an example of the 
defendant.”  Id. at 656.  Allowing the insured to shift 
responsibility for its wrongdoing to the insurance company, 
which “surely will pass to the public its higher cost of doing 
business,” would “defeat the public policies of punishing the 
intentional wrongdoer for its own outrageous conduct and 
deterring it and others from engaging in such conduct in the 
future.”  Id. at 657.   
 
 In agreement with Colorado and California, the New 
York Court of Appeals in Soto held that “the punitive 
damages awarded against an insured in a civil suit are not a 
proper element of the compensatory damages recoverable in a 
suit against an insurer for a bad-faith refusal to settle.”  635 
N.E.2d at 1225.  Although the insureds’ cause of action in 
Soto was based on bad faith liability due to an excess 
judgment, the court’s rationale aligns with Lira and PPG 
Industries.  New York’s public policy precluded 
indemnification for punitive damages, so the Soto court 
concluded that permitting recovery for excess civil judgments 
attributable to punitive damages awards would be unsound 
public policy.  Such a recovery would improperly focus on 
the insurer’s allegedly wrongful act in refusing to settle and 
would minimize the insured’s own blameworthy conduct.  
“Regardless of how egregious the insurer’s conduct has been, 
. . . any award of punitive damages that might ensue is still 
directly attributable to the insured’s immoral and 
blameworthy behavior.”  Id.  The Soto court precluded the 
recovery of punitive damages in order to preserve the 
“condemnatory and retributive character of punitive damage 
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awards.”  Id.  These three cases, all from states that prohibit 
insuring punitive damages, buttress our conclusion that 
Allstate cannot be held responsible for the punitive damages 
award against Zierle. 
 
 Wolfe argues that Allstate breached its duty of good 
faith by unreasonably refusing to negotiate.  Because Allstate 
breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing, under 
Wolfe’s theory, Allstate would become liable for all the 
consequential damages of that breach—including the punitive 
damages award of $50,000.  Wolfe relies on the logic of this 
argument, but does not cite any relevant case law to support 
his assertions.  Although not cited by Wolfe, Carpenter v. 
Automobile Club Interinsurance Exchange, 58 F.3d 1296 (8th 
Cir. 1995), appears to support his position.  The United States 
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit rejected the insurer’s 
argument that due to the exclusion of punitive damages, the 
plaintiff should be barred from recovering those damages: 
We acknowledge that the policy excluded 
coverage for punitive damages, yet we hold that 
Carpenter is entitled to be made whole, which 
necessarily requires her to recover the amount 
of the punitive damages awarded . . . in the 
underlying state court action. Those damages 
are part of the consequential damages flowing 
from AAA’s alleged bad faith and negligence in 
handling Carpenter’s insurance claims. 
 
Id. at 1302.  The Eighth Circuit reached this conclusion by 
interpreting Arkansas law, which stated that “[w]here an 
insurer, either through negligence or bad faith, fails to settle a 
claim against its insured within the policy limits, when it is 
possible to do so, such insurer is liable to the insured for any 
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judgment recovered against him (or her) in excess of such 
policy limits.”  Id. at 1303 (quoting McChristian v. State 
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 304 F. Supp. 748, 750 (W.D. Ark. 
1969)) (alteration in original).  Without referencing public 
policy, the Eighth Circuit reasoned that the plaintiff could not 
be made whole without recovery of the entire amount of the 
judgments obtained in the underlying state court action, 
including punitive damages.  Id.  Because the Eighth Circuit 
did not consider Arkansas’s public policy regarding punitive 
damages in making this determination, we do not find the 
Carpenter court’s literal reading of Arkansas law to be 
persuasive as to what the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would 
conclude. 
 
 In light of Pennsylvania’s public policy against 
insuring punitive damages, which emphasizes personal 
responsibility and deterrence, we conclude that the insured 
cannot shift the punitive damages to its insurer.  Because the 
$50,000 punitive damages award is not a compensable item 
of damages in this case, the District Court erred in allowing 
evidence of that award to be presented to the jury.  The 
District Court here concluded that the $50,000 punitive 
damages award flowed from Allstate’s failure to negotiate a 
settlement in good faith.6  Accordingly, the District Court 
                                              
6 Wolfe argues that the federal jury’s award of $50,000 in 
punitive damages had no relationship to the $50,000 punitive 
damages award in the state personal injury suit.  Rather, he 
asserts, the fact that both awards are $50,000 is a 
“coincidence.”  Although we cannot speak for the federal jury 
as to why it chose to award $50,000 in punitive damages, we 
are persuaded that the record shows more than mere 
17 
 
viewed Wolfe as seeking compensation, not indemnification.  
However, we conclude that punitive damages awarded in the 
underlying case are not properly considered compensable 
damages in Wolfe’s breach of contract claim against 
Allstate.7  The District Court’s ruling effectively shifted 
Zierle’s liability for punitive damages to Allstate, which 
violated Pennsylvania’s public policy.  Because the punitive 
damages award is not a compensable item of damages as a 
matter of law, and because no other reason has been 
suggested for why the earlier punitive award would be 
relevant in a case like this, it is not relevant evidence under 
Federal Rules of Evidence 401 and 402.   
 
 It follows from our reasoning that an insurer has no 
duty to consider the potential for the jury to return a verdict 
for punitive damages when it is negotiating a settlement of 
the case.  To impose that duty would be tantamount to 
                                                                                                     
coincidence for why the jury awarded the same amount here 
as the earlier punitive damages award. 
 
7 Because we exclude this evidence as a matter of 
Pennsylvania’s public policy, we need not reach Allstate’s 
argument that the District Court erred in concluding that the 
punitive damages flowed from Allstate’s failure to settle, 
rather than from Zierle’s egregious conduct and the jury’s 
verdict punishing him for that conduct.  This question of 
proximate cause is not necessary to our holding because, 
regardless of whether the punitive damages in the underlying 
case are “caused” by the insured’s egregious conduct or the 
insurer’s failure to settle, it makes no difference to the 
outcome.  Those punitive damages are not recoverable in a 
later suit against the insurer, as a matter of public policy. 
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making the insurer responsible for those damages, which, as 
we have discussed, is against public policy.  See Zieman Mfg. 
Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 724 F.2d 1343, 1346 
(9th Cir. 1983) (affirming the conclusion by the district court 
that “[t]he proposition that an insurer must settle, at any 
figure demanded within the policy limits, an action in which 
punitive damages are sought is nothing short of absurd.  The 
practical effect of such a rule would be to pass on to the 
insurer the burden of punitive damages in clear violation of 
California statutes and public policy”); see also Wardrip v. 
Hart, 28 F. Supp. 2d 1213, 1215-16 (D. Kan. 1998) (same).  
As a result, Allstate is entitled to a new trial, at which Wolfe 
may not introduce evidence relating to $50,000 in punitive 
damages, although he may seek compensatory damages based 
on injury other than the $50,000 punitive damages award. 
 
B. Summary Judgment8 
 
 We now turn to Allstate’s other argument on appeal—
namely, that the District Court erred by denying Allstate’s 
motion for summary judgment on the breach of contract and 
statutory bad faith claims.  Under Pennsylvania law, bad faith 
by an insurance company can give rise to two separate causes 
                                              
8 We apply a plenary standard of review to our review of a 
denial of summary judgment.  In doing so, we assess the 
record using the same summary judgment standard that 
guided the District Court.  Rivas v. City of Passaic, 365 F.3d 
181, 193 (3d Cir. 2004).  To prevail on a motion for summary 
judgment, the moving party must demonstrate “that there is 
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 
56(a). 
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of action:  a breach of contract action for violation of an 
insurance contract’s implied duty of good faith, and a 
statutory action under the terms of Pennsylvania’s bad faith 
statute, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8371.  Wolfe pursued both claims 
before the District Court. 
 
 Allstate urges that, once the punitive damages award is 
removed from the equation, the District Court should have 
granted summary judgment in its favor, so that a new trial is 
unnecessary.  It urges that an insurer does not breach its duty 
or act in bad faith, as a matter of law, if it does not settle and 
the jury awards a compensatory judgment within the policy 
limits, because there is no harm to the insured.9  We do not 
believe that Allstate’s argument, even if successful in its 
entirety, would necessarily result in a judgment for Allstate.  
We conclude that the District Court correctly denied the 
summary judgment motion on both claims—for breach of 
contract and statutory bad faith—because removing the 
$50,000 punitive damages award from the damages sought 
for these claims does not require entry of judgment in favor of 
Allstate.   
                                              
9 Counsel for Allstate urged at oral argument that an excess 
verdict was necessary in order to have a contractual or bad 
faith claim.  We know of no case that so holds.  And we note 
that the District Court for the Western District of 
Pennsylvania has predicted that the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court would hold that entry of an excess verdict is not 
necessary for a third party bad faith claim under Pennsylvania 
common law.  See McMahon v. Med. Protective Co., No. 13-
911, --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2015 WL 1285790, at *12 (W.D. Pa. 
Mar. 20, 2015).   
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1. Breach of Contract Claim 
 
 Pennsylvania law recognizes a claim in contract for an 
insurer’s breach of its fiduciary obligations to its insured, and 
an insured’s right to recover compensatory damages under 
that claim for injuries sustained as a result of that breach.  
Cowden v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 134 A.2d 223, 227 (Pa. 
1957).  In defining what this duty of good faith entails, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the insurer must 
“consider in good faith the interest of the insured as a factor” 
in deciding whether to settle a claim.  Id. at 228.  Evidence 
showing only “bad judgment” is insufficient for liability and 
“bad faith, and bad faith alone was the requisite to render the 
defendant liable.”  Id. at 229.  An insurer’s bad faith must be 
proven by “clear and convincing evidence.”  Id.  Under 
Cowden and its progeny, if an insurer breaches the 
contractual duty of good faith, the insured is entitled to 
recover “the known and/or foreseeable compensatory 
damages of its insured that reasonably flow from the bad faith 
conduct of the insurer.” Birth Ctr. v. St. Paul Cos., 787 A.2d 
376, 379 (Pa. 2001).  This cause of action is also known as a 
common law bad faith action.  
 
 Wolfe’s breach of contract claim sought recovery of 
the $50,000 punitive damages award; interest on the $50,000 
punitive damages award; and attorney’s fees and costs.  By 
removing the $50,000 award from consideration, we remove 
all compensatory damages that Wolfe seeks, based on the 
statements in his complaint.  However, this does not require 
summary judgment in favor of Allstate on this claim. 
   
 Under Pennsylvania law, if a plaintiff is able to prove a 
breach of contract but can show no damages flowing from the 
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breach, the plaintiff is nonetheless entitled to recover nominal 
damages.  Thorsen v. Iron & Glass Bank, 476 A.2d 928, 931 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1984); see also Scobell Inc. v. Schade, 688 
A.2d 715, 719 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997).  “A grant of summary 
judgment on the sole basis of absence of provable damages, 
therefore, is generally improper.”  Thorsen, 476 A.2d at 931.  
Federal courts applying Pennsylvania law have agreed with 
the impropriety of summary judgment in such a situation.  See 
Haywood v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 976 F. Supp. 2d 606, 645 
(W.D. Pa. 2013) (“Haywood’s motion for summary judgment 
must, therefore, be denied because the University, if it proves 
the other elements of a claim for breach of contract, may be 
entitled to nominal damages.”).  Therefore, even without 
compensatory damages, an insurer can be liable for nominal 
damages for violating its contractual duty of good faith by 
failing to settle.  Accordingly, we affirm the District Court’s 
denial of the motion for summary judgment as to the breach 
of contract claim. 
 
2. Bad Faith Claim Under Section 8371 
 
 Pennsylvania also provides a statutory remedy for bad 
faith in section 8371.  If an insurer has “acted in bad faith 
toward the insured,” a court may: 
(1) Award interest on the amount of the claim 
from the date the claim was made by the 
insured in an amount equal to the prime rate of 
interest plus 3%. 
(2) Award punitive damages against the insurer. 
(3) Assess court costs and attorney fees against 
the insurer. 
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42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8371.  Section 8371 does not provide for 
the award of compensatory damages, which, if sought, must 
be recovered based on other theories.  See Birth Ctr., 787 
A.2d at 386. 
 
 This statute was enacted in response to a 1981 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision holding that there was 
no common law “bad faith” cause of action for a plaintiff 
whose insurance company wrongfully refused to pay a claim 
under an insurance policy.  See generally D’Ambrosio v. Pa. 
Nat’l Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 431 A.2d 966 (Pa. 1981).  In 1990, 
the Pennsylvania legislature enacted section 8371, which 
created a new cause of action for bad faith on the part of the 
insurer.  See Polselli v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 126 
F.3d 524, 529 (3d Cir. 1997) (describing history).   
 
 Section 8371 does not define “bad faith,” but we have 
predicted that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would follow 
the definition of bad faith, and test for liability, set out by the 
Pennsylvania Superior Court in Terletsky v. Prudential 
Property & Casualty Insurance Co., 649 A.2d 680 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1994).  See Nw. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Babayan, 430 
F.3d 121, 137 (3d Cir. 2005).  Terletsky defined “bad faith” as   
any frivolous or unfounded refusal to pay 
proceeds of a policy; it is not necessary that 
such refusal be fraudulent.  For purposes of an 
action against an insurer for failure to pay a 
claim, such conduct imports a dishonest 
purpose and means a breach of a known duty 
(i.e., good faith and fair dealing), through some 
motive of self-interest or ill will; mere 
negligence or bad judgment is not bad faith. 
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649 A.2d at 688 (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 139 (6th 
ed. 1990)).  To recover under section 8371, a plaintiff must 
show by clear and convincing evidence that the insurer did 
not have a reasonable basis for denying benefits under the 
policy and that the insurer knew or recklessly disregarded its 
lack of reasonable basis in denying the claim.  Id.   
 
 The removal of the $50,000 as compensatory damages 
does not require summary judgment in favor of Allstate on 
the bad faith claim under section 8371.  Section 8371 “sets 
forth no . . . requirement to be entitled to damages for the 
insurer’s bad faith.”  Berg v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 44 
A.3d 1164, 1177 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012).  In Berg, the court 
stated: 
[T]he focus in section 8371 claims cannot be on 
whether the insurer ultimately fulfilled its policy 
obligations, since if that were the case then 
insurers could act in bad faith throughout the 
entire pendency of the claim process, but avoid 
any liability under section 8371 by paying the 
claim at the end. . . . [T]he issue in connection 
with section 8371 claims is the manner in 
which insurers discharge their duties of good 
faith and fair dealing during the pendency of an 
insurance claim, not whether the claim is 
eventually paid.  
Id. at 1178 (citing Toy v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 928 A.2d 186, 
199 (Pa. 2007)).  The policy behind section 8371—deterring 
insurance companies from engaging in bad faith practices—is 
furthered by allowing a statutory bad faith claim to proceed 
even where the insured has alleged no compensatory damages 
resulting from that conduct.  See March v. Paradise Mut. Ins. 
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Co., 646 A.2d 1254, 1256 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994) (explaining 
that section 8371 “was promulgated to provide additional 
relief to insureds and to discourage bad faith practices of 
insurance companies”).  Accordingly, removal of the $50,000 
punitive damages award as damages in this suit has no 
bearing on the damages that can be awarded under the 
statutory bad faith claim.10 
 
 Therefore, Wolfe does not need compensatory 
damages to succeed on his statutory bad faith claim, which 
only permits recovery of punitive damages, interest, and 
costs.  Accordingly, we affirm the District Court’s denial of 
the motion for summary judgment as to the bad faith claim, 
                                              
10 Recovery on Wolfe’s breach of contract claim and his 
statutory bad faith claim are entirely independent of one 
another.  Section 8371 allows punitive damages awards even 
without any other successful claim.  See Willow Inn, Inc. v. 
Pub. Serv. Mut. Ins. Co., 399 F.3d 224, 235 (3d Cir. 2005); 
see also March, 646 A.2d at 1256 (“[Because] claims under 
section 8371 are separate and distinct causes of action and as 
the language of section 8371 does not indicate that success on 
the contract claim is a prerequisite to success on the bad faith 
claim, . . . an insured’s claim for bad faith brought pursuant to 
section 8371 is independent of the resolution of the 
underlying contract claim.”); accord Margolies v. State Farm 
Fire & Cas. Co., 810 F. Supp. 637, 642 (E.D. Pa. 1992).  
Furthermore, Wolfe’s claim under section 8371 does not 
affect his ability to obtain compensatory damages, if they 
exist, under a breach of contract claim. “The statute does not 
prohibit the award of compensatory damages.  It merely 
provides an additional remedy and authorizes the award of 
additional damages.”  Birth Ctr., 787 A.2d at 386. 
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because Wolfe’s inability to collect the $50,000 as 
compensatory damages does not preclude recovery on that 
claim as a matter of law. 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
 We will vacate the District Court’s judgment resulting 
from the jury’s verdict as to the breach of contract claim and 
the bad faith claim under section 8371.  We will reverse the 
District Court’s ruling denying the motion in limine and 
remand for a new trial on both these claims, at which Wolfe 
will be barred from introducing evidence of the $50,000 
punitive damages award.  We will affirm the District Court’s 
denial of summary judgment on both the breach of contract 
and statutory bad faith claims. 
